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Slower Growth in Medicare Spending
for harsh, simple­minded cuts set­
ting the stage for broad­based 
payment reform. Up until the 
early 1980s, Medicare reimbursed 
hospitals for costs incurred, sub­
ject to ceilings. The Tax Equity 
and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 
1982 substantially tightened those 
limits, leaving hospitals with no 
upside — they could not earn a 
profit by reducing costs — and a 
growing downside for those 
whose costs exceeded the limits. 
The next year, legislation was 
passed, with the support of the 
hospital industry, replacing cost 
reimbursement with the inpatient 
prospective payment system (IPPS), 
with rates initially calibrated to 
leave Medicare outlays unchanged. 
Hospitals then had the opportu­
nity to reduce costs per admis­
sion by shortening lengths of stay 
and to earn a positive margin in 
the process.
The IPPS is generally viewed 
as a major policy success: it en­
couraged hospitals to seek effi­
ciencies, and when they found 
those efficiencies, it allowed the 
federal government to share in 
the savings. Should ACOs and 
other reforms prove effective, 
they will provide broader oppor­
tunities to increase the efficiency 
of delivery beyond shortening 
lengths of stay, such as managing 
chronic disease more effectively 
so as to keep beneficiaries out of 
the hospital in the first place. 
But our current challenge is more 
complex than the one faced in 
the early 1980s. Broadening the 
unit of payment will require 
reaching across different types of 
providers and helping to stitch 
together real delivery systems in 
places where now there are none.
Disclosure forms provided by the authors 
are available with the full text of this arti­
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The Potential for Cost Savings through Bundled Episode Payments
David M. Cutler, Ph.D., and Kaushik Ghosh, Ph.D.
In the quest to manage the spi­raling cost of U.S. health care, 
one approach has generated great 
interest. The philosophy behind 
much current policy — including 
the Affordable Care Act (ACA) — 
is that aggregating fee­for­service 
reimbursement into payments for 
broader bundles of care will lead 
to greater efficiency in the provi­
sion of care and thus lower costs.
Under the accountable care 
organization model, perhaps the 
best­known example of this strat­
egy, medical reimbursements are 
aggregated to the person­year 
level. Other programs aggregate 
reimbursement for episodes of 
care — for example, care for a 
particular cardiovascular or ortho­
pedic condition. The Episode of 
Care Payment Demonstration proj­
ect, which is authorized by the 
ACA, requires the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services 
to experiment with bundling 
Medicare Part A and Part B pay­
ments for inpatient care. It re­
sembles the Acute Care Episode 
payment program, an ongoing 
demonstration program that 
bundles Part A and Part B pay­
ments for select types of inpa­
tient care episodes.
The central issue in any pro­
posal for aggregating payments 
is determining at what level ser­
vices should be bundled together. 
Episode­based bundled payments 
are easier for individual physi­
cians or small physician groups 
to manage, since a given physi­
cian is often involved in the full 
course of a care episode. In con­
trast, accepting global payments 
for all of a particular patient’s 
care generally requires a high de­
gree of integration among multi­
ple physicians. It may be for this 
reason that episode­based bun­
dled payments seem to save more 
money than patient­based bundled 
payments.1 On the other hand, 
bundling payments for care epi­
sodes does not provide incentives 
to reduce the number of episodes. 
If limiting the number of epi­
sodes of care is a major consider­
ation in reducing costs, bundling 
care at the patient level would be 
preferred.
A central issue, then, is the 
tradeoff between the relative ease 
of bundling at the episode level 
and the additional savings incen­
tives from bundling at the patient 
level. Are a good share of poten­
tial savings given up by using 
only episodes for setting bundled 
payments?
We set out to estimate the cost 
savings associated with episode­
based and patient­based bundled 
payments. For episode­based bun­
dled payment, we selected a ran­
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dom 5% of the elderly population 
in fee­for­service Medicare in 2007, 
assigning the principal diagnosis 
code of every hospital admission 
to one of 285 categories in the 
Clinical Classification System, as 
determined by the Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality. 
We considered a new episode to 
have started when a claim was not 
preceded by a hospitalization re­
lated to the same organ system 
within 180 days. For example, a 
hospital admission in March 2007 
for myocardial infarction would 
count as a new episode if there 
were no related hospitalizations 
during the prior 6 months. A read­
mission for heart failure 2 months 
later would count as part of the 
same episode. In all cases, reha­
bilitation services would not qual­
ify as a new episode.
We then assigned to each epi­
sode under consideration all in­
patient and outpatient spending 
for the same organ system occur­
ring within 180 days of the epi­
sode’s onset (going into 2008 as 
necessary). Under this definition, 
a person could have multiple over­
lapping episodes (for example, a 
myocardial infarction and a hip 
fracture within a 6­month period). 
Some claims, however, were not 
assigned to an episode — for in­
stance, physician visits not relat­
ed to a prior hospitalization. We 
adjusted for geographic differenc­
es in prices using data from the 
Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care 
for 2007 Medicare reimbursements 
in each hospital referral region.2
Using these criteria, we arrived 
at 245 types of episodes. In total, 
spending on these episodes ac­
counted for just over half of Medi­
care spending for this sample in 
2007. The remainder of spend­
ing was for physician and outpa­
tient claims not associated with a 
hospitalization. Spending was 
not uniform across episodes but 
was instead concentrated within 
a relatively small number. The top 
5 and top 17 episode types (see 
table) accounted for one fourth 
and one half, respectively, of the 
costs of the 245 episode types, 
and three fourths of the spending 
on these episodes was accounted 
for by the top 43 conditions.
The most expensive condition 
was osteoarthritis, and most epi­
sodes of care for osteoarthritis 
involved elective hip or knee 
 replacement. Other high­cost epi­
sodes included those for cardio­
vascular conditions and muscu­
Cost Savings through Bundled Episode Payments
Total Cost for the 17 Most Expensive Conditions among Medicare Patients 65 Years of Age or Older.*
Rank
CCS 
 Category Condition
Total Spending
(billions of U.S. $)
Share of Total 
Spending (%)
Cumulative 
Share (%)
1 203 Osteoarthritis 7.3 5.7  5.7
2 101 Coronary atherosclerosis and other heart disease 6.5 5.1 10.8
3 226 Fracture of neck of femur (hip) 5.8 4.6 15.4
4 108 Congestive heart failure, nonhypertensive 5.8 4.5 19.9
5 109 Acute cerebrovascular disease 4.8 3.8 23.7
6 122 Pneumonia (except that caused by tuberculosis or STD) 4.7 3.7 27.4
7 106 Cardiac dysrhythmias 4.4 3.5 30.9
8 100 Acute myocardial infarction 4.4 3.5 34.4
9 237 Complication of device, implant, or graft 3.2 2.5 36.9
10 205 Spondylosis, intervertebral disk disorders, other back problems 3.1 2.5 39.4
11 2 Septicemia (except in labor) 2.7 2.1 41.5
12 127 COPD and bronchiectasis 2.5 2.0 43.5
13 159 Urinary tract infections 2.3 1.8 45.3
14 131 Respiratory failure; insufficiency; or arrest (adult) 2.1 1.6 46.9
15 157 Acute and unspecified renal failure 1.8 1.5 48.4
16 231 Other fractures 1.8 1.4 49.8
17 96 Heart valve disorders 1.6 1.3 51.1
Total spending 64.8
* The sample contains Medicare beneficiaries at least 65 years of age who do not belong to a health maintenance organization and 
who are entitled to both Part A and Part B during the month of their first inpatient admission for that episode and all 6 months 
after their first admission. Costs are calculated for the same organ system within 180 days after the start of the episode. CCS de-
notes Clinical Classification System, COPD chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, and STD sexually transmitted disease.
The New England Journal of Medicine 
Downloaded from nejm.org at SIMMONS COLLEGE on April 1, 2016. For personal use only. No other uses without permission. 
 Copyright © 2012 Massachusetts Medical Society. All rights reserved. 
n engl j med 366;12 nejm.org march 22, 2012
PERSPECTIVE
1077
loskeletal conditions (hip and leg 
fractures). This is not surprising, 
since the usual candidates for 
bundled payments are episodes 
of care for hip fractures and joint 
replacements3 and for cardiac 
care.4 Individual cancers did not 
make the top 17 (colon cancer 
being the most costly, at number 
28), though cancer as a whole is 
very costly.
A cost­distribution analysis for 
the 17 most expensive episodes 
shows that the initial inpatient 
admission accounted for 60% of 
spending. Subsequent admis­
sions (i.e., readmissions related 
to the same organ system) ac­
counted for 23%, with separately 
billed physician services (i.e., 
procedures and evaluation and 
management) totaling another 
10% and non­inpatient imaging 
representing 1%. The remainder 
of spending was for durable medi­
cal equipment, home health care, 
hospice care, and other items.
By averaging costs for each 
condition in the 306 hospital re­
ferral regions, we also found that 
spending varies widely from re­
gion to region. For each condi­
tion, some regions are high­cost, 
whereas others are low­cost. To 
translate this variation into po­
tential dollars saved, we simulat­
ed what the spending would be if 
costs in each area in which the 
average was above the 25th per­
centile were brought down to the 
25th­percentile level — a feat 
that might be accomplished if, 
for example, Medicare paid a bun­
dled rate for episodes and capped 
it at the level of the 25th­percen­
tile areas. If it did so, the reduc­
tion in costs for these 17 con­
ditions would be $10 billion 
annually. If the cap were set at 
the 50th­percentile level, the sav­
ings would be $4.7 billion. If such 
caps were applied to all 245 epi­
sode types, the annual savings 
gained from reducing spending 
to the 25th­percentile level would 
total $29 billion; reducing it to 
the 50th­percentile level would 
save $15 billion.
To estimate the amounts of 
patient­based global payments, 
we determined the average costs 
per patient in each of the 306 
hospital referral regions, again 
adjusting for regional price differ­
ences. Setting the patient­based 
global payment at the level of aver­
age spending in the 25th­percen­
tile regions would save $35 billion 
nationally. If spending were set 
at the 50th­percentile level, the 
savings would be $18.2 billion 
nationally.
These results suggest that an 
episode­based bundled­payment 
system could save nearly as much 
as a patient­based bundled­pay­
ment system. Episode­based bun­
dled payments would save 83% 
of the amount that would be saved 
with the use of a patient­based 
bundling system if the 25th­per­
centile standard were used and 
82% if the 50th­percentile stan­
dard were used. The reason for 
this similarity is that there can be 
substantial heterogeneity in spend­
ing for different types of episodes 
within a given region. Some re­
gions have high spending for cer­
tain conditions even if they have 
low spending overall. Episode­
based payment encourages effi­
ciency in treating the conditions 
on which spending is high, re­
gardless of whether the region as 
a whole is low­cost. Patient­based 
payment, by contrast, achieves no 
additional savings if the region 
as a whole is not high­cost.
In summary, our results sug­
gest that it is possible to achieve 
very substantial health care sav­
ings by moving from a fee­for­
service model to bundled pay­
ments for episodes of care, 
whether in a stand­alone pro­
gram or as a component of an 
overall global­payment model. The 
primary limitation of our analy­
sis is that we haven’t accounted 
for heterogeneity in the complex­
ity of disease within episode types 
that may affect the average costs 
in a region. We suspect that such 
variations in average complexity 
are small,5 however, so that our 
results are an accurate estimate 
of cost savings from episode­
based bundled payments.
Disclosure forms provided by the authors 
are available with the full text of this article 
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